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Abstract
We consider land rental problems where there are several communi-
ties that can act as lessors and a single tenant who does not necessary
need all the available land. A rule should determine which commu-
nities become lessors, how much land they rent and at which price.
We present a complete characterization of the family of rules that sat-
isfy reassignment-proofness by merging and spliting, apart from land
monotonicity. We also define two parametric subfamilies. The first
one is characterized by adding a property of weighted standard for
two-person. The second one is characterized by adding consistency
and continuity.
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1 Introduction
The management of land and natural resources is one of the most critical
challenges facing developing countries (Kaye and Yahya, 2012; van der Ploeg
and Rohner, 2012). In particular, natural resource exploitation is an indus-
trial activity that has recently been generating conflicts between firms and
indigenous communities in many countries in Latin America, Africa and Asia.
Examples include Mexico (Tetreault, 2015), Peru (Arellano-Yanguas, 2011;
Fraser, 2018), Sierra Leone (Akiwumi, 2014), India (Sarkar, 2015, 2017), Viet-
nam (Nguyen et al., 2018) and Indonesia (Welker, 2009). Another examples
appear in Sosa (2011) and Walter and Urkidi (2015). Another two examples,
both in Colombia, arise from a restitution problem where two agents have
rights over the land (Jaramillo et al., 2014) and from land aggregating for
housing and infrastructure (Kominers and Weyl, 2012), respectively.
In these land conflicts, there exist rights over the land for each side. For
the case of mining activities, Article 10 of the United Nations Declaration
on the Rights of Indigenous People defined Free Prior and Informed Consent
(FPIC) as the principle that indigenous communities have the right to give
or withhold its consent to proposed projects that may affect the land they
customarily own, occupy or otherwise use (UN, 2007). On the other hand,
the mining firm has an investment and a concession over those lands, or,
even if a concession has not been granted yet, the firm may have a profit
opportunity high enough to make it possible to compensate the land owners
in a fair way (Helwege, 2015). In order to solve these land conflicts, it is
fundamental for the planner (e.g. the government) to have all the relevant
information about both sides.
In many situations, land identification and demarcation may be not clear,
as in the case of customary land (Gildenhuys, 2005; Azima et al., 2015). This
situation can lead to manipulation by merging or splitting of the communi-
ties, due to the fact that they may have incentives to strategically misrepre-
sent their identity in order to influence the final outcome to their own advan-
tage. The study of this kind of manipulation is common in the strategy-
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proofness literature in the context of cost sharing (Moulin and Shenker,
2001; Sprumont, 2005; Go´mez-Ru´a and Vidal-Puga, 2011; Ju, 2013; Masso´
et al., 2015), resource allocation (Erlanson and Flores-Szwagrzak, 2015), job
scheduling (Moulin, 2007, 2008), indivisible object allocation (Sun and Yang,
2003; Svensson, 2009; Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015), assigning problems
(Kojima and Manea, 2010), and taxation problems (Ju and Moreno-Ternero,
2011), among others. Splitting and merging proofness have also been deeply
studied in bankruptcy problems where an estate E > 0 should be divided
among a set of claimants N with claims given by c ∈ RN . Several authors
(O’Neill, 1982; Moulin, 1987; Chun, 1988; de Frutos, 1999; Ju, 2003; Moreno-
Ternero, 2006, 2007; Ju et al., 2007) have showed that merging and splitting
proofness in bankruptcy problems leads to a proportional share of the estate.
See for example Thomson (2003, 2015a).
In this article, we assume that the government or planner seeks to assign
a price and amount of land fairly and efficiently, and at the same time, to
guarantee non-manipulability by reassignment-proofness. In particular, our
work can be seen as part of the theory of mechanism design applied to land
rental (see Sen (2007) for an overview and Sarkar (2017) for a more recent
contribution). We assume there is a single tenant who can be a mining firm,
and several lessors who can be a group of communities. Each community has
some available amount of land ci with a reservation price r per unit, that
for simplicity we consider equal for all of them. The mining firm needs to
rent an optimal amount of adjacent land E, which is a completely divisible
object1.
A rule determines, for each land rental problem, a quantity of adjacent
land to be rented by each community and a price that the mining firm must
pay as a way of compensation.
In order to study rules that guarantee non-manipulability, we propose a
version of strategy-proofness such that communities should not find it prof-
itable to re-assign the land among them. For instance, asumme we have two
1We use the terms c and E because of their resemblance to bankruptcy problems.
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lessors, and the first of them may decide to act as two lessors by spliting her
land. A rule which considers a fix price per unit of land and an equalitar-
ian land share will not satisfy reassigment-proofness, because the first lessor
finds it profitable to split her land.
Also, we propose a version of land monotonicity that assures fairness, in
the sense that an increase in the quantity of available land affects positively
the final profits to both sides.
Our first result is a complete characterization of the family of rules that
satisfy these properties. A rule belongs to this family of rules if the price
does not depend on the available land and each amount of rented land is
proportional. By adding a property inspired by “standard for two-person”
in Hart and Mas-Colell (1989), we characterize a parametric subfamily. A
rule belongs to this parametric subfamily of rules if, aditionally, the price
depends on a parameter. Another property is consistency, that states that
the rule should behave in a similar way independently of the number of agents
involved. This is a classical property in cooperative games (see van den Brink
et al. (2013) and Huettner (2015) for two recent applications), and it has
also been studied in bankruptcy problems (see Thomson (2008, 2015b) and
references herein) and cost sharing problems (see for example Albizuri and
Zarzuelo (2007) and Koster (2012)). By adding consistency and continuity we
characterize another parametric subfamily of rules. The intersection of both
parametric subfamilies singles out two particular rules: one of them optimal
for the tenant, where the price coincides with to the tenant’s reservation
price, and the other optimal for the lessors, where the price coincides with
the maximun feasible value.
We organize the paper as follows: In Section 2, we present the model.
In Section 3, we study and characterize the family of rules that satisfy land
reassignment-proofness and land monotonicity. In Section 4, we characterize
the family of rules that also satisfy a weighted version of “standard for two-
person”. Finally, in Section 5, we characterize the subfamily of rules that
satisfy reassignment-proofness, land monotonicity, consistency and continu-
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ity.
2 The model
Let N+ = {1, 2, . . . } be the set of potential lessors. Let N = {1, 2, . . . , n}
be an arbitrary set of lessors, and let S be an arbitrary subset of N . Given
y ∈ RS, we write y(S) = ∑i∈S yi. Given x, y ∈ RS, we write x ≤ y when
xi ≤ yi for all i ∈ S. Moreover 0S denotes the vector (0, . . . , 0) ∈ RS. We
denote the set of nonnegative real numbers as R+, and the set of positive
real numbers as R++. We denote the set of rational numbers as Q.
Let V N = {{i, j} : i, j ∈ N} be the set of all unordered pairs {i, j} over
N . The elements of V N are called edges. A network G over N is a subset
of V N . We say that G is a connected network when, for all i, j ∈ N , there
exists a sequence of different edges {{is−1, is}}es=1 that satisfy {is−1, is} ∈ G
for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , e}, i = i0 and j = ie. We denote the set of all connected
networks over N as GN . Given G ∈ GN and S ⊂ N , we denote the restriction
of G to S as GS, i.e. GS = {{i, j} ∈ G : i, j ∈ S}.
A land rental problem is a tuple (N0, µ, c, r, G) where N0 = {0} ∪ N is
the set of agents with 0 the unique tenant and N the set of lessors, µ :
R+ → R is a function that assign to each amount of adjacent land the
tenant’s revenue when that amount is rented, c ∈ RN++ is the vector whose
coordinates represent the amount of available land for each lessor, r ∈ R+
is the reservation price per unit of land for lessors, G ∈ GN identifies the
lessors whose land is adjacent. Hence, the aggregate welfare when the tenant
rents l units of adjacent land is µ(l) + (c(N) − l)r. We normalise µ(0) = 0,
and assume that G is a connected network and that there exists a unique
E ∈]0, c(N)] such that µ(E) + (c(N) − E)r is maximum2 on [0, c(N)].3 We
then denote K = µ(E) as the optimal welfare that the agents can obtain.
This implies that K > rE, i.e. there exists benefit of cooperation.
2Since rc(N) is constant, this condition is equivalent to µ(E)− rE be maximum.
3This condition holds, for example, when µ is increasing and strictly concave.
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Under these conditions, an efficient allocation implies that the amount of
rented adjacent land is E and the welfare of the tenant is K. Thus, the only
relevant parameters of µ are E and K. Furthermore, for convenience we use
N instead of N0. Henceforth, we would be interested in the “efficient land
rental problem”, denoted by (N,K,E, c, r, G). Let L be the set of all land
rental problems.
A feasible agreement is a pair (x, p) ∈ RN+ × R+ satisfying x ≤ c and
{i ∈ N : xi > 0} a connected component in G, where xi is the land rented
by lessor i ∈ N , and p is the price per unit of land. The set of feasible
agreements on a land rental problem L is denoted as AL. Let A = ⋃L∈LAL
be the set of all potential feasible agreements.
Given (x, p) ∈ AL, the utility for tenant and each lessor i ∈ N are
u0(x, p) = µ(x(N))− px(N) and ui(x, p) = (p− r)xi, respectively.
We define a rule as a function ψ : L −→ A that assigns to each prob-
lem L = (N,K,E, c, r, G) ∈ L a feasible agreement (x, p) = ψ(L) ∈ AL,
satisfying:
(i) x(N) = E;
(ii) for all α, β > 0, p(N,αK, βE, βc, α
β
r,G) = α
β
p(N,K,E, c, r, G) and
x(N,αK, βE, βc, α
β
r,G) = βx(N,K,E, c, r, G);
(iii) r ≤ p ≤ K
E
.
The first condition (efficiency) says that the amount of land rented is opti-
mal. The second condition (scale invariance) says that the final price and
the amount of land rented are independent of changes of scale. The third
condition (individual rationality) says that the lessors get at least zero (this
is implied by r ≤ p), and under efficiency, the tenant also gets at least zero
(this is implied by p ≤ K
E
). Under efficiency, the utility of the tenant can be
rewritten as u0(x, p) = K − pE.
There exist two special classes of rules: On the one hand, a rule is tenant-
optimal when the price is given by p = r. In that case, xi is irrelevant for
each i ∈ N , because their payoffs are zero, and so the final payoff allocation is
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unique. On the other hand, a rule is lessors-optimal when the price is given
by p = K
E
. In the latter case, there are many possible payoff allocations when
E < c(N), all of them giving zero to the tenant.
3 Land reassignment and monotonicity
Since there may be no official registration and demarcation of the customary
land, the lessors can reach an agreement of reallocating it in order to share
extra benefits so created under a rule.
Formally, assume N = (N \ S) ∪ S, where N \ S is connected in G and
represents the set of lessors that rearrange their land, while S is the set of
lessors that do not. Hence, a new land problem arises, with N ′ = (N ′\S)∪S
as the new set of lessors, so that S = N ∩N ′. Moreover, the new connected
network G′ that determines the adjacent lands should be compatible with G
in the sense that GS = G
′
S and, for all i ∈ S,
∃j ∈ N \ S : {i, j} ∈ G⇔ ∃j′ ∈ N ′ \ S : {i, j′} ∈ G′.
In this case, we say that G and G′ are S-compatible.
For the planner it is not possible to see this customary land situation,
and it may be hard to get the outcome that the rule is supposed to attain.
In our context manipulation implies that the lessors will benefit by merging
or splitting under reallocating their land. Our aim is to fully identify rules
that are free from this concern. We formalise this property as follows.
Reassignment-proofness (RP) Given (N,K,E, c, r, G), (N ′, K,E, c′, r, G′) ∈
L such that ci = c′i for all i ∈ S = N ∩N ′, c(N \ S) = c′(N ′ \ S), and
G and G′ are S-compatible, a rule ψ is reassignment-proof if∑
i∈N\S
ui(ψ(N,K,E, c, r, G)) =
∑
i∈N ′\S
ui(ψ(N
′, K,E, c′, r, G′)).
If the right-hand side of expression is larger than the left-hand side and
the problem is (N,K,E, c, r, G), then lessors in N \S can gain by reallocating
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their land so that the problem becomes (N ′, K,E, c′, r, G′). Analogously, if
the left-hand side of expression is larger than the right-hand side and the
problem is (N ′, K,E, c′, r, G′), then lessors in N ′ \S can gain by reallocating
their land so that the problem becomes (N,K,E, c, r, G). S is the set of
lessors that remain unchanged (S = ∅ is also possible). This property pre-
vents lessors from having incentives for merging or splitting by reallocating
their land.
The following property says that an increase of the available land, leaving
K and E unaffected, is (weakly) beneficial for everyone involved.
Land Monotonicity (LM) Given (N,K,E, c, r, G), (N,K,E, c′, r, G′) ∈ L
with c ≤ c′ and G ⊆ G′, a rule ψ is land monotonic if
(i) u0(ψ(N,K,E, c, r, G)) ≤ u0(ψ(N,K,E, c′, r, G′)), and
(ii) for each i ∈ N , cj = c′j for all j 6= i implies ui(ψ(N,K,E, c, r, G)) ≤
ui(ψ(N,K,E, c
′, r, G′)).
Under this property, the tenant will be weakly better off when there are
more available land. Furthermore, when only one lessor has more available
land and the rest of lessors remain unchanged, this lessor will be weakly
better off.
Let F be the set of functions f : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with f(t) ≥ t for all
t ∈ [0, 1]. Now, we consider the family of rules defined by p = K
E
f( rE
K
) for
some f ∈ F and xi = ciEc(N) for all i ∈ N . So, we obtain different rules with
different functions f ∈ F . These functions determine the price, whereas
the amount of land is always divided proportionally, in line with the known
results on invariance under reassignment in cost and surplus sharing (cf.
Theorem 1.1 in Moulin (2002)). Figure 1 represents six examples of these
functions.
Theorem 3.1 A rule ψ satisfies RP and LM if and only if there exists f ∈ F
such that the price is given by p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
and, when p 6= r, the assigned
amount of land is given by xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N .
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f(t) = t
(a)
1
1
f(t) = 1
(b)
1
1
f(t)
(c)
1
1
f(t) = 1
f(t) = 1.4t
(d)
1
1
f(t) = t+1
2
(e)
1
1
f(t) = 1
f(t) = 2t
(f)
Figure 1: Examples of functions in F that determine six different rules,
including an optimal rule for the tenant (a) and an optimal rule for the
lessors (b).
Proof. (⇐) Let ψ be a rule given by p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
for some f ∈ F and,
when p 6= r, xi = ciEc(N) for all i ∈ N . We will prove that ψ satisfies RP and
LM. In order to prove that ψ satisfies RP, let L = (N,K,E, c, r, G) ∈ L,
L′ = (N ′, K,E, c′, r, G′) ∈ L and S = N ∩ N ′ given as the definition of
RP. Let t = rE
K
∈ [0, 1[. On the one hand, we have ∑i∈N\S ui(ψ(L)) =∑
i∈N\S
(
K
E
f (t)− r) ciE
c(N)
= K (f (t)− t)
(
1− c(S)
c(N)
)
. Analogously, on the
other hand, we have
∑
i∈N ′\S ui(ψ(L
′)) = K (f (t)− t)
(
1− c′(S)
c′(N ′)
)
. Since
c(N \S) = c′(N ′ \S) and ci = c′i for all i ∈ S, we have that c(S) = c′(S) and
c(N) = c′(N ′). Hence the last two expressions coincide. We now prove that ψ
satisfies LM. Let L and L′ = (N,K,E, c′, r, G′) ∈ L given as in the definition
of LM. If c ≤ c′, then, by efficiency, u0(ψ(L)) = K− KE f
(
rE
K
)
E = u0(ψ(L
′)),
hence condition (i) holds. If ci ≤ c′i and c(N \ {i}) > 0, and cj = c′j for all
j ∈ N \ {i} then ui (ψ(L)) =
(
K
E
f
(
rE
K
)− r) ciE
c(N)
≤ (K
E
f
(
rE
K
)− r) c′iE
c′(N) =
ui (ψ (L
′)) for all i ∈ N , hence condition (ii) also holds.
(⇒) Let ψ be a rule that satisfies RP and LM. For simplicity, we write
(x, p) instead of ψ(N,K,E, c, r, G), (x′, p′) instead of ψ(N ′, K,E, c′, r, G′) and
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so on. Furthermore, we write ui instead of ui(x, p), u
′
i instead of ui(x
′, p′)
and so on. We proceed by series of claims.
Claim 3.1 If K = E = 1 and N = {1}, then the price p does not depend
on c.
Proof. By LM, if c1 ≤ c′1, then u0 ≤ u′0. By efficiency, u0 ≤ u′0 can be
rewritten as 1 − p ≤ 1 − p′, hence p ≥ p′ (the higher c1, the higher p).
Analogously, c1 ≤ c′1 implies u1 ≤ u′1 and p ≤ p′ (the higher c1, the lower p).
Therefore, p = p′. 
We define f(t) = p({1}, 1, 1, (1), t, ∅) for all t ∈ [0, 1]. By individual
rationality, t ≤ p({1}, 1, 1, (1), t, ∅) ≤ 1 for all t ∈ [0, 1], so f ∈ F .
Claim 3.2 If K = E = 1, then p = f(r).
Proof. Assume first 1 /∈ N . By RP, u(N) = u1 (ψ({1}, 1, 1, (c(N)), r, ∅)).
Under Claim 3.1 and efficiency, this is equal to p({1}, 1, 1, (1), r, ∅)−r, hence
u(N) = f(r)− r. Furthermore, by efficiency, u(N) = ∑i∈N(p− r)xi = p− r.
Therefore, we have p = f(r). Assume now 1 ∈ N . Let i ∈ N+\N . Under RP,
ui (ψ({i}, 1, 1, (c(N)), r, ∅)) = u1 (ψ({1}, 1, 1, (c(N)), r, ∅)) and we proceed as
before. 
Claim 3.3 p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
.
Proof. By scale invariance, p = K
E
p
(
N, 1, 1,
(
c
E
)
, rE
K
, G
)
, and under Claim
3.2 we have that p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
. 
Therefore, the price is determined by Claim 3.3. Now we focus on the
amount of land x.
Claim 3.4 If p 6= r and there exist i, j ∈ N such that ci = cj, then xi = xj.
Proof. Fix α ∈ N+ \N . We define (N iα, K,E, ciα, r, Giα) ∈ L, where N iα =
{i, α}, ciαi = ci, ciαα = c(N \ {i}), and Giα = {{i, α}}. Since N ∩N iα = {i},
then by RP, u(N \ {i}) = uiα(N iα \ {i}). Under Claim 3.3 and p 6= r, we
obtain x(N \ {i}) = xiαα . Furthermore, by efficiency x(N \ {i}) + xi = E and
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xiαi + x
iα
α = E. From these last three equalities we obtain that xi = x
iα
i . We
define (N jα, K,E, cjα, r, Gjα) ∈ L, where N jα = {j, α}, cjαj = ciαi = ci = cj,
cjαα = c
iα
α , and G
jα = {{j, α}}. Since N iα ∩N jα = {α} and ciαi = cjαj , by RP,
ui(x
iα, piα) = uj(x
jα, pjα). Under Claim 3.3 and p 6= r, we obtain xiαi = xjαj .
Since N jα∩N = {j} and cjαα = c(N \{j}), by RP, uα(xjα, pjα) = u(N \{j}),
and under Claim 3.3 and p 6= r, we obtain xjαα = x(N \ {j}). Furthermore,
by efficiency we have xjαj +x
jα
α = E and xj +x(N \{j}) = E. So, from these
last three equalities we obtain xjαj = xj. Then, from xi = x
iα
i , x
iα
i = x
jα
j and
xjαj = xj we get that xi = xj. 
Claim 3.5 If N = {i, j}, p 6= r and ci, cj ∈ Q, then xi = ciEci+cj and xj =
cjE
ci+cj
.
Proof. Assume ci =
ai
bi
and cj =
aj
bj
where a and b are non-negative integers.
LetN i, N j ⊂ N+\N withN i∩N j = ∅, |N i| = aibj and |N j| = ajbi. We define
(N∗i, K,E, c∗i, r, G∗i) ∈ L with N∗i = N i ∪ {j} and c∗ik = 1bibj for all k ∈ N i,
c∗ij = cj, and G
∗i = {{k, j} : k ∈ N i}. Since N ∩N∗i = {j} and c∗i(N∗i \j) =
ci, by RP, ui = u
∗i(N∗i \ {j}). Under Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to write
(p − r)xi = (p − r)x∗i(N∗i \ {j}). Since p 6= r, xi = x∗i(N∗i \ {j}). We
now define (N∗ij, K,E, c∗ij, r, G∗ij) ∈ L with N∗ij = N i ∪N j, c∗ijk = 1bibj for
all k ∈ N∗ij, and G∗ij = {{k, k′} : k ∈ N i, k′ ∈ N j}. Since c∗i(N∗i \ {j}) =
c∗ij(N∗ij \N j), N∗i∩N∗ij = N i and c∗ij(N∗ij \N i) = ∑ajbil=1 1bibj = cj = c∗ij , by
RP, u∗ij = u
∗ij(N∗ij \N i). Under Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to write (p −
r)x∗ij = (p− r)x∗ij(N∗ij \N i). Since p 6= r, x∗ij = x∗ij(N∗ij \N i) = x∗ij(N j).
On the one hand, by efficiency, xi+xj = E and x
∗i(N∗i\{j})+x∗ij = E. Since
xi = x
∗i(N∗i\{j}) and x∗ij = x∗ij(N j), we obtain xj = x∗ij(N j). On the other
hand, by efficiency, x∗i(N∗i \ {j}) + x∗ij = E and x∗ij(N i) + x∗ij(N j) = E.
Since xi = x
∗i(N∗i \ {j}) and x∗ij = x∗ij(N j), we obtain xi = x∗ij(N i).
We have (N∗ij, K,E, c∗ij, r, G∗ij) with N∗ij ∩ N = ∅ and c∗ij(N∗ij) = c(N).
By RP, u∗ij(N∗ij) = u(N). By p 6= r and Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to
write x∗ij(N∗ij) = x(N). Under Claim 3.4 and efficiency, we obtain that
x∗ijk =
E
|N∗ij | =
E
aibj+ajbi
for all k ∈ N∗ij. By efficiency and xj = x∗ij(N j), we
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have that xi = E − x∗ij(N j). Under Claim 3.4, this is equivalent to write
xi = E− ajbix∗ijk for each k ∈ N∗ij. Since x∗ijk = Eaibj+ajbi for all k ∈ N∗ij, we
have xi = E − ajbiEaibj+ajbi = ciEci+cj . Analogously, xj =
cjE
ci+cj
. 
Claim 3.6 If N = {i, j}, p 6= r and cj ∈ Q, then xi = ciEci+cj and xj =
cjE
ci+cj
.
Proof. Assume first ci+cj = E. Then,
ciE
ci+cj
= ci and
cjE
ci+cj
= cj. By efficiency,
xi = ci and xj = cj. Therefore, xi =
ciE
ci+cj
and xj =
cjE
ci+cj
. Assume now
ci + cj > E. Let {csi}∞s=1 be a decreasing sequence of rational numbers that
converges to ci. For each s, we take (N,K,E, c
s, r, G) ∈ L with cs = (csi , cj).
Under Claim 3.5, we have xs =
( csiE
csi+cj
,
cjE
csi+cj
)
. By LM, ui(x, p) ≤ ui(xs, ps).
Under Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to write (p − r)xi ≤ (p − r)xsi . Since
p 6= r, this is equivalent to xi ≤ xsi . Under Claim 3.5, xs =
( csiE
csi+cj
,
cjE
csi+cj
)
,
which is equivalent to write xi ≤ c
s
iE
csi+cj
. Hence, xi ≤ ciEci+cj . Let {ĉsi}∞s=1 be
an increasing sequence of positive rational numbers that converges to ci and
such that L̂s = (N,K,E, ĉs, r, G) ∈ L, where ĉs = (ĉsi , cj). We can find
such a sequence because ci > 0 and ci + cj > E. Under Claim 3.5, we have
x̂s =
( ĉsiE
ĉsi+cj
,
cjE
ĉsi+cj
)
. By LM, ûsi ≤ ui. Under Claim 3.3, this is equivalent
to write (p − r)x̂si ≤ (p − r)xi. Since p 6= r, this is equivalent to x̂si ≤ xi.
Under Claim 3.5, x̂s =
(
ĉsiE
ĉsi+cj
,
cjE
ĉsi+cj
)
, which is equivalent to write
ĉsiE
ĉsi+cj
≤ xi.
Hence, ciE
ci+cj
≤ xi. Since xi ≤ ciEci+cj and ciEci+cj ≤ xi, we obtain xi = ciEci+cj . By
efficiency, xj = E − xi. Since xi = ciEci+cj , we deduce xj = E − ciEci+cj =
cjE
ci+cj
.

Claim 3.7 If N = {i, j} and p 6= r, then xi = ciEci+cj and xj =
cjE
ci+cj
.
Proof. Assume first ci + cj = E. Then,
ciE
ci+cj
= ci and
cjE
ci+cj
= cj. By
efficiency, xi = ci and xj = cj. Therefore, xi =
ciE
ci+cj
and xj =
cjE
ci+cj
. Assume
now ci + cj > E. Let {csj}∞s=1 a decreasing sequence of rational numbers that
converges to cj. For each s, we take (N,K,E, c
s, r, G) ∈ L with cs = (ci, csj).
Under Claim 3.6, we have xs =
(
xi,
csjE
ci+csj
)
. By LM, uj(x, p) ≤ uj(xs, ps).
Under Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to write (p − r)xj ≤ (p − r)xsj . Since
p 6= r, this is equivalent to xj ≤ xsj =
csjE
ci+csj
. Hence, xj ≤ cjEci+cj . Let {ĉsj}∞s=1
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be an increasing sequence of rational numbers that converges to cj and such
that L̂s = (N,K,E, ĉs, r, G) ∈ L, where ĉs = (ci, ĉsj). We can find such
a sequence because ci > 0 and ci + cj > E. Under Claim 3.6, we have
x̂s =
(
xi,
ĉsjE
ci+ĉsj
)
. By LM, ûsj ≤ uj. Under Claim 3.3, this is equivalent to
write (p − r)x̂sj ≤ (p − r)xj. Since p 6= r, this is equivalent to x̂sj ≤ xj,
or
ĉsjE
ci+ĉsj
≤ xj. Hence, cjEci+cj ≤ xj. Since xj ≤
cjE
ci+cj
and
cjE
ci+cj
≤ xj, we
obtain xj =
cjE
ci+cj
. By efficiency, xi = E − xj. Since xj = cjEci+cj , we deduce
xi = E − cjEci+cj = ciEci+cj . 
Claim 3.8 If p 6= r, then xi = ciEc(N) for all i ∈ N .
Proof. Let i ∈ N , j ∈ N+ \ N and (N ij, K,E, cij, r, Gij) ∈ L with N ij =
{i, j}, ciji = ci, cijj = c(N \ {i}), and Gij = {{i, j}}. By efficiency, xi =
E − x(N \ {i}). By RP and p 6= r, we have x(N \ {i}) = xijj , so that
xi = E − xijj . Under Claim 3.7, xijj =
cijj E
ciji +c
ij
j
. Hence, xi = E − c
ij
j E
ciji +c
ij
j
=
E − c(N\{i})E
ci+c(N\{i}) =
ciE
c(N)
. 
Therefore, the amount of land is determined by Claim 3.8. 
We denote ψf as the rule corresponding to f ∈ F that is given by p =
K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
, and xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N .
4 Weighted standard for two-person
We study a property that is inspired on the so called standard for two-person
property by Hart and Mas-Colell (1989). This property follows a “divide the
surplus equally” idea for two-person situations. In our context, the two-
person case arises when |N | = 1, i.e. the only agents are the tenant and
a single lessor. Standard for two-person says that both the tenant and the
lessor obtain equal benefit. We formalize this property as follows. Let L2 be
the set of land rental problems with a unique lessor.
Standard for 2-person (S2) Given L = ({1}, K,E, c, r, ∅) ∈ L2,
u0 (ψ(L)) = u1 (ψ(L)) .
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Next theorem characterizes the unique rule that satisfies RP, LM and S2.
The function that determines this rule is represented in Figure 1(e).
Theorem 4.1 A rule ψ satisfies RP, LM and S2 if and only if the price is
given by p = K+rE
2E
and the amount of land is given by xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N .
Proof. (⇐) Let ψ be a rule given by p = K+rE
2E
and xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N .
It is straightforward to check that ψ = ψf with f(t) = 1+t
2
for all t and
p = K+rE
2E
. By Theorem 3.1, ψ satisfies RP and LM. So, we just need to
prove that u0(ψ({1}, K,E, c, r, ∅)) = u1(ψ({1}, K,E, c, r, ∅)). The left side
of the equality is equal to K − K+rE
2E
E = K−rE
2
. Analogously, the right side
of the equality is equal to
(
K+rE
2E
− r)x1. By efficiency, x1 = E, and hence
we obtain u1(ψ({1}, K,E, c, r, ∅)) = K−rE2 . Therefore, the equality holds.
(⇒) Let ψ be a rule that satisfies RP, LM and S2. By Theorem 3.1
there exists f ∈ F such that p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
and, when, p 6= r, xi = ciEc(N)
for all i ∈ N . We need to prove that K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
= K+rE
2E
or equivalently
f(t) = 1+t
2
for t = rE
K
∈ [0, 1]. By S2, we have u0 (ψ({1}, 1, 1, (1), t, ∅)) =
u1 (ψ({1}, 1, 1, (1), t, ∅)). This is equivalent to 1− f(t)x1 = (f(t)− t)x1. By
efficiency, x1 = 1, which is equivalent to write 1 − f(t) = f(t) − t. Hence,
f(t) = 1+t
2
. Finally, since K > rE and c1 = c(N), we deduce p 6= r so
x1 =
c1E
c(N)
= E. 
Next, we generalize the standard for two-person concept in a nonsymmet-
ric way. Notice that S2 determines the final payoffs for two-person problems,
forcing both the tenant and the unique lessor to receive the same value. Since
tenant and lessor are not symmetric, we can reasonably allow one side of the
market to extract a higher value than the other. In our context, since the
rules satisfy efficiency, it is enough to fix the relative payoff between both
agents. In particular, a rule satisfies the next property when the payoffs are
in the same proportion for every single-lessor problem.
Weighted Standard for 2-person (WS2) There exists ω ∈ [0, 1] such
that
(1− ω)u0 (ψ(L)) = ωu1 (ψ(L))
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for all L = ({1}, K,E, c, r, ∅) ∈ L2.
Next theorem characterizes the parametric subfamily of rules that satisfy
RP, LM and WS2. We can see three examples of functions that determine
these rules in Figure 1 (a), (b) and (e), respectively.
Theorem 4.2 A rule ψ satisfies RP, LM and WS2 if and only if there exists
ω ∈ [0, 1] such that the price is given by p = K−(K−rE)ω
E
and, when ω < 1,
the quantity of land is given by xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N .
Proof. (⇐) Fix ω ∈ [0, 1]. Let ψ be a rule given by p = K−(K−rE)ω
E
and, if ω <
1, then xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N . By Theorem 3.1, ψ satisfies RP and LM for
f(t) = 1− (1− t)ω and p = K−(K−rE)ω
E
. Fix L = ({1}, K,E, c, r, ∅). We just
need to prove that (1−ω)u0(ψ(L)) = ωu1(ψ(L)). The left side of the equality
is equal to (1 − ω)
(
K − K−(K−rE)ω
E
E
)
= (1 − ω)ω(K − rE). Analogously,
the right side of the equality is equal to ω(K−(K−rE)ω
E
− r)x1. By efficiency,
x1 = E, and hence the right hand side of the equality is ω(1− ω)(K − rE).
Therefore, equality holds.
(⇒) Let ψ be a rule that satisfies RP, LM and WS2. Let ω ∈ [0, 1]. By
Theorem 3.1, there exists f ∈ F such that p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
and, when p 6= r,
xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N . This implies x(N) = E. It is clear that ω < 1 implies
p 6= r. To see why, notice that p = r implies u1 = 0, whereas u0 + u1 =
K − rE > 0, so u0 > 0, and by WS2, (1−ω)u0 = ωu1 = 0, so (1−ω)u0 = 0,
which implies ω = 1. We still need to prove that K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
= K−(K−rE)ω
E
or,
equivalently, f(t) = 1− (1− t)ω for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Let t = rE
K
∈ [0, 1]. By WS2
we have (1 − ω)u0 (ψ({1}, 1, 1, (1), t, ∅)) = ωu1 (ψ({1}, 1, 1, (1), t, ∅)). This
is equivalent to (1 − ω)(1 − f(t)x1) = ω(f(t) − t)x1, which by efficiency is
equivalent to write (1 − ω)(1 − f(t)) = (f(t) − t)ω. Rearranging terms, we
deduce f(t) = 1− (1− t)ω. 
Notice that, when ω = 1, we obtain an optimal rule for the tenant, and
when ω = 0, we obtain an optimal rule for the lessors. Given ω ∈ [0, 1], we
denote ψω as the rule corresponding to the function ψf with f(t) = 1−(1−t)ω
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for all t and xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N . In particular, ψ 12 is the rule given in
Theorem 4.1.
5 Consistency
Consistency is a well-known principle. Assume that there exists an agreement
on what the right price and land share are, and that some lessors take this
price and leave. The tenant and the rest of lessors can proceed in two ways:
On the one hand, they can keep the previous price and land share. On the
other hand, they can recompute the right price and land share following the
same principle as before in the new reduced land renting problem. This new
reduced land rental problem is defined as L′ = (N ′, K ′, E ′, c′, r, G′) ∈ L given
by N ′ = N \S where S ⊂ N is the set of lessors that leave, K ′ = K−px(S) is
the new maximal profit of the tenant, E−x(S) is the amount of land that the
tenant still needs in the new reduced land rental problem, c′ = cN\S ∈ RN\S++
is the vector whose coordinates represent the amount of available land, r is
the reservation price, which is equal as in the original land rental problem,
and G′ identifies the lessors in N ′ whose land is adjacent, directly or through
lessors in S. If this procedure always gives the same result for agents in N0\S
as before, we say that ψ is consistent.
Consistency For all (N,K,E, c, r, G) ∈ L and S ⊂ N such that GS is a
connected network and x(S) < E, a rule ψ is consistent if
ui (ψ (N
′, K ′, E ′, c′, r, G′)) = ui(ψ(N,K,E, c, r, G))
for all i ∈ N ′0, where N ′ = N \ S, K ′ = K − px(S), E ′ = E − x(S),
c′i = ci for all i ∈ N ′, and
G′ = GN ′ ∪
{
{i, j} ∈ V N ′ : ∃k, k′ ∈ S s.t. {i, k}, {j, k′} ∈ G
}
.
Next proposition characterizes the second parametric subfamily of rules
that satisfy RP, LM and consistency. We can see some examples of functions
that determine these rules in Figure 1 (a), (b), (d) and (f), respectively.
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Proposition 5.1 A rule ψ satisfies RP, LM and consistency if and only if
there exist α, β ∈ [0, 1] with α ≤ β such that:
a) The price is given as follows:
a.1) If r = 0, then either p = 0 or p = K
E
.
a.2) If r > 0 and rE < αK, then p = β
α
r.
a.3) If r > 0 and rE = αK, then p = β
α
r or p = K
E
.
a.4) If r > 0 and rE > αK, then p = K
E
.
b) The amount of land when p 6= r is given by xi = ciEc(N) for all i ∈ N.
Proof. (⇐) Let α, β ∈ [0, 1] with α ≤ β so that the price and the amount
of land are given by a) and b), respectively. Let f ∈ F defined as follows:
f(0) ∈ {0, 1}, f(t) = β
α
t if 0 < t < α, f(α) ∈ {β, 1} if α > 0, and f(t) =
1 if t > α. Then, the price can be written as p = K
E
f( rE
K
). Hence, by
Theorem 3.1, ψ satisfies RP and LM. Let L = (N,K,E, c, r, G) and L′ =
(N ′, K ′, E ′, c′, r, G′) given as in the definition of consistency. We will prove
that ui(x, p) = ui(x
′, p′) for all i ∈ N0 \ S, where (x, p) = ψ(L) and (x′, p′) =
ψ(L′). Firstly, we prove that p′ = p. We distinguish the following cases:
Case 1: r = 0 and p = 0. In this case, f(0) = 0. Hence, p′ = 0 and p = 0.
Case 2: r = 0 and p = K
E
. In this case, f(0) = 1. Hence, p′ = K
′
E′ . Therefore,
p′ = K
′
E′ =
K−K
E
x(S)
E−x(S) =
K
E
= p.
Case 3: r > 0, rE < αK and p = β
α
r. Under a.2), we know that p′ = β
α
r
when r > 0 and rE ′ < αK ′. Since r > 0, it is enough to check
that rE ′ < αK ′. Equivalently, r (E − x(S)) < α (K − β
α
rx(S)
)
. Since
rE < αK, it is enough to check that rx(S) ≥ βrx(S). This is trivially
true when rx(S) = 0. Otherwise, it is equivalent to check that β ≤ 1,
which is true by definition.
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Case 4: r > 0, rE = αK and p = β
α
r. In this case, p = K
E
β, so f
(
rE
K
)
=
β. Since rE
′
K′ =
r(E−x(S))
K−K
E
βx(S)
= rE(E−x(S))
K(E−βx(S)) and β ≤ 1, we have that
rE′
K′ ≤ rE(E−x(S))K(E−x(S)) = rEK = α. Hence, rE ′ ≤ αK ′. We will show that
f
(
rE′
K′
)
= β
α
rE′
K′ . We have two sub-cases: First, if rE
′ < αK ′, then it
holds by a.2) and the fact that p′ = K
′
E′ f
(
rE′
K′
)
. Second, if rE ′ = αK ′,
then f
(
rE′
K′
)
= f(α)
(rE=αK)
= f
(
rE
K
)
= β. Since rE ′ = αK ′, we obtain
that f
(
rE′
K′
)
= β
α
rE′
K′ . Hence, p
′ = K
′
E′ f
(
rE′
K′
)
= K
′
E′
β
α
rE′
K′ =
β
α
r= p
Case 5: r > 0, rE = αK, and p = K
E
. Since p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
and p = K
E
, we
deduce f
(
rE
K
)
= 1. Moreover, rE
′
K′ =
r(E−x(S))
K−K
E
x(S)
= rE(E−x(S))
K(E−x(S)) =
rE
K
= α.
Hence, f
(
rE′
K′
)
= f(α). Since rE = αK and f
(
rE
K
)
= 1, we deduce
f
(
rE′
K′
)
= 1. Hence, p′ = K
′
E′ f
(
rE′
K′
)
= K
′
E′ =
K−K
E
x(S)
E−x(S) =
K
E
= p.
Case 6: rE > αK. In this case, p = K
E
. Under a.4), we know that p′ = K
′
E′
when rE ′ > αK ′. Since K
′
E′ =
K−K
E
x(S)
E−x(S) =
K
E
, it is enough to check
that rE ′ > αK ′. This is equivalent to check that r(E − x(S)) >
α
(
K − K
E
x(S)
)
. Equivalently, r (E − x(S)) > αK
(
E−x(S)
E
)
. Since
E−x(S) > 0, this is equivalent to rE > αK, which is true in this case.
We check now that ui(ψ(L
′)) = ui(ψ(L)) for all i ∈ N0 \ S. Assume first
i ∈ N \ S. We need to prove that (p − r)x′i = (p − r)xi. This is trivially
true when p = r. Hence, assume p 6= r. We need to prove x′i = xi. Since
c(N) = c(N \ S) + c(S), then x′i = cic(N\S)(E − x(S)) = cic(N\S)
(
E − c(S)E
c(N)
)
=
ci
c(N\S)
(
c(N)−c(S)
c(N)
)
E = ci
c(N\S)
(
c(N\S)
c(N)
)
E = ci
c(N)
E = xi. Assume now i = 0.
We check that u0(ψ(L
′)) = u0(ψ(L)), or K ′ − pE ′ = K − pE. By definition,
K ′ − pE ′ = (K − px(S))− p(E − x(S)) = K − pE.
(⇒) Let ψ be a rule that satisfies RP, LM and consistency. Under RP
and LM, by Theorem 3.1 there exists f ∈ F such that p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
and,
when p 6= r, xi = cic(N)E for all i ∈ N .
Denote L = (N,K,E, c, r, G) and let S ⊂ N with E > x(S) and L′ =
(N ′, K ′, E ′, c′, r, G′) be defined as in the definition of consistency. Hence,
we have ui(x, p) = ui(x
′, p′) for all i ∈ N0 \ S, where (x, p) = ψ(L) and
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(x′, p′) = ψ(L′). In particular, u0(x, p) = u0(x′, p′). By definition, this is
equivalent to K ′ − p′E ′ = K − pE, or K − px(S)− p′(E − x(S)) = K − pE.
Since E 6= x(S), we deduce p′ = p.
We will prove the existence of α and β with α ≤ β, such that the price is
given as in a). Or, equivalently,
f(0) ∈ {0, 1},
f(t) =
β
α
t if t ∈]0, α[,
f(α) ∈ {β, 1} when α > 0, and
f(t) = 1 if t > α.
(1)
If f(t) = 1 for all t ∈ [0, 1], then α = 0 and β = 1 satisfy (1). Hence, we
can assume that there exists t̂ such that f
(
t̂
)
< 1. Let α = Sup{t : f(t) < 1}
and β = Sup{f(t) : f(t) < 1}. Then, f(t) ≥ t for all t implies α, β ∈ [0, 1]
and α ≤ β.
For each r ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈]0, 1[, assume L = ({1, 2}, 1, 1, (γ, 1− γ), r, G)
and S = {2}. So, K ′ = K − px2 = 1 − f(r)(1 − γ) and E ′ = E − x2 = γ.
Hence, we have L′ = ({1}, 1− f(r)(1− γ), γ, (γ), r, ∅).
So, p = K
E
f
(
rE
K
)
= f (r) and p′ = K
′
E′ f
(
rE′
K′
)
= 1−f(r)(1−γ)
γ
f
(
rγ
1−f(r)(1−γ)
)
.
Since p′ = p, from the last two expressions, we have
f
(
rγ
1− f(r)(1− γ)
)
=
f(r)γ
1− f(r)(1− γ) for all r ∈ [0, 1] and γ ∈]0, 1[. (2)
In particular, for r = 0, we have f(0) = f(0)γ
1−f(0)(1−γ) for all γ. If f(0) 6= 0,
then γ = 1− f(0)(1− γ) for all γ, or equivalently, (1− f(0))γ = 1− f(0) for
all γ, which implies that f(0) = 1. Hence f(0) ∈ {0, 1}. This is the first line
of (1).
For t > α, we have f(t) = 1. This is the fourth line of (1).
For each r ∈]0, 1[, we define F r(δ) = rδ
1−f(r)(1−δ) ∈ [0, r] for all δ ∈]0, 1].
If f(r) < 1, then F r is a strictly increasing and continuous function, and its
inverse is given by Gr(t) = (1−f(r))t
r−f(r)t ∈]0, 1[ for all t ∈]0, r]. Given t ∈]0, r] and
r ∈]0, 1[ such that f(r) < 1,
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f(t) = f (F r (Gr(t))) = f
(
rGr(t)
1− f(r)(1−Gr(t))
)
(2)
=
f(r)Gr(t)
1− f(r)(1−Gr(t))
=
f(r) (1−f(r))t
r−f(r)t
1− f(r)
(
1− (1−f(r))t
r−f(r)t
) = f(r)
r
t.
Assume α > 0. Then we can fix r ∈]0, 1[ such that f(r) < 1. Hence,
f(t)
t
= f(r)
r
for all t ∈]0, r]. We will prove that f(t) = θt for all t ∈]0, α[,
where θ = f(r)
r
. For all t ∈]0, α[, there exists r′ > t such that f(r′) < 1 and
f(t)
t
= f(r
′)
r′ . If t < r, we can take r
′ = r, thus f(t)
t
= θ. If t ≥ r, then r′ > r,
thus f(r)
r
= f(r
′)
r′ = θ. Hence, f(t) = θt for all t ∈]0, α[. We will prove that
θ = β
α
, or equivalently rβ = αf(r). We have two cases:
Case I. If f(α) = 1, then β = Sup{f(t) : t ∈]0, α[} = Sup{θt : t ∈]0, α[} =
θα. Hence, θ = β
α
.
Case II. If f(α) < 1, then f(α)
α
= θ, so that f(t) = θt for all t ∈]0, α] and
β = Sup{f(t) : t ∈]0, α]} = Sup{θt : t ∈]0, α]} = θα. Hence, θ = β
α
.
Then, the second line of (1) is satisfied.
From Case I and Case II we can deduce f(α) ∈ {β, 1}. This is the third
line of (1). 
Given α, β ∈ [0, 1] with α ≤ β, we define ψα,β as the rule corresponding
to the function given in Proposition 5.1 with f(0) = 0, f(α) = β and such
that the amount of land is given by xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N .
Next property says that small changes in the land rental problem should
not cause large changes in the chosen allocation.
Continuity The price p and the amount of land x are continuous functions
on L.
The rules that satisfy RP, LM, consistency and continuity constitute a
particular subfamily of rules from the one determined in Proposition 5.1
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and it is characterized in the next theorem. We can see some examples of
functions that determine these rules in Figure 1 (a), (b) and (f), respectively.
Theorem 5.1 A rule ψ satisfies RP, LM, consistency and continuity if and
only if there exists α ∈ [0, 1] such that:
a)
p =
 rα if rE < αKK
E
if rE ≥ αK
and
b)
xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N.
Proof. (⇐) Let α ∈ [0, 1] such that the price and amount of land are given
by a) and b) respectively. Part a) can be written as p = K
E
f( rE
K
) with
f ∈ F given as f(t) = t
α
if t < α and f(t) = 1 if t ≥ α. Hence, by
Proposition 5.1, ψ satisfies RP, LM and consistency. To prove it that satisfies
continuity we still need to check that p is continuous at the points where
rE = αK. Equivalently, limrE→αK+ rα =
K
E
, which holds trivially. Moreover,
xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N also determines a continuous function.
(⇒) Under RP, LM and consistency, by Proposition 5.1 there exist α, β ∈
[0, 1] with α ≤ β such that the price is given as in part a) of Proposition
5.1, and the amount of land when p 6= r, is given by xi = ciEc(N) for all i ∈ N .
By adding continuity, we will prove that p = r
α
if rE ≤ αK and p = K
E
if
rE ≥ αK. Moreover, xi = ciEc(N) for all i ∈ N . In this sense, we have that p
is a continuous functions in ]0, α[∪]α, 1]. We still need to prove the following
cases:
i) If r = 0, by continuity, p = limt→0
β
α
t = 0 = t
α
.
ii) If rE = αK, by continuity, β
α
r = K
E
. Then, β = Kα
rE
= 1.
21
We need to prove that xi =
ciE
c(N)
for all i ∈ N when p = r. Let Lt =
(N,K,E, c, rt, G) ∈ L with limt→∞rt = 0 and rt > 0 for all t. Therefore,
xti =
ciE
c(N)
for all t ∈ [0, 1]. Then, under continuity of the land function,
xi = limr→0 ciEc(N) =
ciE
c(N)
. 
Notice that the functions provided in Theorem 5.1 are those ψα,β with
β = 1. In particular, ψ0,1 = ψ0 (rule ψω when ω = 0) is a rule optimal for
the tenant and ψ1 (rule ψω when ω = 1) is a rule optimal for the lessors.
These two rules are the only ones that belong to both parametric sub-
families defined at Theorem 4.2 and Theorem 5.1, respectively. Both rules
are characterized in the next proposition. We can see the functions that
determine these rules in Figure 1 (a) and (b), respectively.
Proposition 5.2 ψ0 and ψ1 are the only rules that satisfy RP, LM, WS2,
consistency and continuity.
Proof. It is straightforward to check that both ψ0 and ψ1 satisfy these prop-
erties. Let ψ be a rule that satisfies these properties. We will prove that ψ
is either ψ0 or ψ1. On the one hand, by Theorem 5.1, there exists α ∈ [0, 1]
such that p = K
E
when rE = αK. On the other hand, by Theorem 4.2, there
exists ω ∈ [0, 1] such that p = K−(K−rE)ω
E
for all r. Hence, given r = αK
E
,
we have K
E
= K−(K−rE)ω
E
, or (K − rE)ω = 0. There are two possibilities:
On the one hand, ω = 0 which gives ψ = ψ0. On the other hand, K = rE
and rE = αK imply K = αK. Since K > 0, we deduce α = 1 which gives
ψ = ψ1,1 = ψ1. 
A summary of the results is presented in Table 1.
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Property ψf ψω ψα,1 ψ
1
2 ψ0 ψ1
Reassignment-proofness Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes Yes
Land Monotonicity Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes* Yes Yes
Standard for 2-person - - No Yes* No No
Weighted Standard for 2-person - Yes* - Yes Yes Yes
Consistency - - Yes* No Yes Yes
Continuity - Yes Yes* Yes Yes Yes
Table 1: Summary of the results. Symbol * means that this property, to-
gether with others in the same column, characterizes the family/rule.
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